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hildren are in the vanguard of America’s
increasing racial and ethnic diversity. The
majority of newborn babies today are among
racial and ethnic minority populations, according to
recent Census Bureau estimates. U.S. Census Bureau
projections indicate that by 2043, non-Hispanic
whites will cease to be a majority of the American
population. For America’s children and youth,
the future is now.1 American diversity is fueled by
differing fertility rates among racial and ethnic
groups, changes in the racial composition of women
of childbearing age, and immigration. Here we
document how unfolding demographic forces have
placed today’s children and youth at the forefront of
America’s new racial and ethnic diversity. America’s
rapidly changing racial and ethnic composition has
important implications for intergroup relations, ethnic identities, and electoral politics.2
Much of the growing racial diversity is caused by
unprecedented population increases of minority children, particularly Hispanic children. It is also due to a
significant numerical decline in the number of nonHispanic white children, which is less often appreciated.
The Great Recession reduced fertility and domestic
migration rates and slowed the flow of immigrants, yet
the demographic forces fueling diversity are unrelenting. Diversity has unfolded unevenly in geographic
space. More than 600 U.S. counties, or approximately
one-fifth of U.S. counties, had “majority-minority”
youth populations in 2012—a number considerably
higher than for the U.S. population overall. The frequent claim that we live in an increasingly multiracial
or multicultural society does not necessarily mean

that national patterns have played out at the local or
regional level. Racial diversity is spreading unevenly
from state to state, community to community, and
neighborhood to neighborhood.
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Increasing Racial and
Ethnic Diversity Among
America’s Children
Approximately 37 percent of the
U.S. population was a racial or
ethnic minority in 2012. The pace
of this change has been particularly
rapid among America’s children
and youth. In 1990, 32 percent of
the population younger than age
20 was minority, increasing to 39
percent in 2000. By July of 2012, 47
percent of the 82.5 million people
under age 20 in America were from
minority populations (Figure 1).
In contrast, minorities represented
only 33 percent of the 231.4 million
residents age 20 or older. Within
this older population, Hispanics
(14 percent) constituted a slightly
larger share of the population than
blacks (12 percent). However,
among those under age 20,
Hispanics constituted 24 percent
and blacks constituted 14 percent.
The acceleration of racial and
ethnic diversity is evidenced further
when we compare preschool-age
children with older teenagers.
Minorities represented 48 percent
of the population under age 5 in
2012 but only 43 percent among
15- to 19-year-olds. This age gradient of minority representation
clearly highlights America’s new and
increasing diversity.
The growth of America’s minority population, coupled with recent
population declines of non-Hispanic
white children, fuel the growing
youth diversity in the United States.
Between 2000 and 2012, the number
of minority young people grew by 7.7
million (25 percent). The Hispanic
youth population accounted for 5.8
million, or approximately 75 percent
of the increase in the U.S. minority

FIGURE 1. ADULT AND YOUTH POPULATION BY RACE/HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2012

Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
Notes: Adults are age 20 and over, and youth are under age 20. Hispanic category includes Hispanics of any race.
Other category includes native peoples and those of two or more races.

population under age 20, after
increasing by 42 percent between
2000 and 2012 (Figure 2). This
recent gain supplements substantial
Hispanic population gains during the
1990s. The number of people under
20 in the “other” minority group (primarily Asian and multiracial) grew by
2.3 million (42 percent) between 2000
and 2012. In contrast, the young black
population declined (-2.8 percent)
during the same period. The population decline of young blacks—historically the largest minority group in the
country—underscores the fundamental demographic changes underway in
America’s minority population.
The rapid growth of the minority
youth population contrasts sharply
with patterns among young whites.
The number of young whites
increased by only 54,000 (1 percent) during the 1990s. However,
since 2000, the number of young
non-Hispanic whites has declined
by 5.7 million (-11.5 percent). As

a result, the proportion of young
people who are non-Hispanic white
declined from 61 to 53 percent
between 2000 and 2012.

Minority Births Increase,
White Births Diminish
Fertility has played an important
role in the shifting patterns of racial
diversity. In 1990, non-Hispanic
whites accounted for nearly twothirds of all births. Blacks accounted
for the second largest number of
births (17 percent), followed by
Hispanics (15 percent). By 2012, U.S.
births decreased by 5 percent compared with 1990, but Hispanic births
had risen by more than 50 percent.
Births to non-Hispanic whites and
blacks diminished during the same
period. By 2012, non-Hispanic white
births represented slightly less than
half of all births according to Census
Bureau estimates, while Hispanic
births grew to 26 percent of all births.
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FIGURE 2. ANNUALIZED POPULATION CHANGE FOR THOSE UNDER AGE 20
BY RACE/HISPANIC ORIGIN, FROM 1990 TO 2000 AND FROM 2000 TO 2012

Source: Decennial Census 1990 and 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

African-America births remained
stable at 15 percent of the total.
Differences with regard to race
and Hispanic origin among women
in their prime childbearing years
(ages 20 to 39) contributed significantly to America’s changing racial
and ethnic mix. During the 1990s,
the number of non-Hispanic white
women of prime childbearing age
declined by nearly 4 million (-12.8
percent) and declined by another
2.4 million between 2000 and 2012
(Figure 3). In contrast, the number of minority women of prime
childbearing age grew by 2.8 million (25 percent) in the 1990s and
by 3.8 million (25 percent) between
2000 and 2012. Hispanic women
accounted for slightly more than 61
percent of this absolute minority
gain. The number of other minority
women in their prime childbearing
years also increased significantly,

although population gains among
black women were minimal.
The cumulative effect of these
changes in the number of women
of prime childbearing age has been
considerable. By 2012, there were
6.2 million (-21 percent) fewer nonHispanic white women of prime
childbearing age than there were in
1990. In contrast, 6.6 million (58
percent) more minority women
were in their prime childbearing
years. As a result, the proportion of
all women in their prime childbearing years who were non-Hispanic
white decreased from 73 percent to
57 percent between 1990 and 2012.
High Hispanic fertility rates, along
with early childbearing, combined
with increasing numbers of Hispanic
women to produce large increases
in births to Hispanic mothers in the
past two decades. Hispanic women
continue to have higher fertility rates
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than their counterparts, although
their total fertility rate declined
significantly from nearly 3 children in
1990 to roughly 2.2 children in 2012
(Figure 4). Early childbearing also
characterizes the Hispanic population; 44 percent of all Hispanic newborns had mothers younger than age
25. In contrast, non-Hispanic white
women delayed childbearing and had
lower fertility rates; approximately 30
percent of white babies were born to
mothers younger than age 25.
Black women also have children
at a younger age than the U.S. average, but declining black fertility has
diminished the young black population. The groups that constitute
most “other” minorities (Asians and
multiracial groups) also had low
total fertility rates, so population
gains were primarily attributable
to the rising numbers of women
of childbearing age in this group
rather than to high fertility rates.
Clearly, below-replacement fertility among non-Hispanic whites
intensifies the demographic effect

The Great Recession has had
a significant impact on U.S.
fertility. Overall, births dropped
from 4.3 million in 2007 to
slightly less than 4 million in
2012—a decline of 8.4 percent.
of increasing numbers of minority
women with high fertility rates on
America’s racial and ethnic diversity.
The Great Recession has had a
significant impact on U.S. fertility.
Overall, births dropped from 4.3
million in 2007 to slightly less than
4 million in 2012—a decline of 8.4
percent. Furthermore, the latest
data do not suggest a recovery in
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FIGURE 3. ANNUALIZED POPULATION CHANGE OF WOMEN AGED 20–39,
FROM 1990 TO 2000 AND FROM 2000 TO 2012

Source: Decennial Census 1990 and 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

FIGURE 4. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1990,
2000, 2007, AND 2012

fertility rates. Fewer births have
implications for the diversity of the
child population because recessionary declines in fertility rates
have been uneven among racial
and ethnic populations. Fertility
rate declines were much higher
for women in their 20s than for
women in their 30s. Between
2007 and 2012, the fertility rate
of women in their 20s dropped
by 15.3 percent compared with a
gain of 0.8 percent for women in
their 30s. Many younger women
appear to be delaying childbearing, although older women who are
more financially secure and facing
limited fertility horizons are not.
Hispanic women in their 20s
experienced the largest fertility
rate decline between 2007 and
2012 (Figure 5). Fertility rates for
young women declined in other
racial groups as well, but the
declines were more modest. These
changing patterns of fertility have
implications for the diversity of
young children. Because of the
precipitous decline in Hispanic
fertility rates, Hispanic births
declined between 2007 and 2012
despite an increase of nearly 16
percent in the number of Hispanic
women of prime childbearing age.
Non-Hispanic white and black
births also dropped because of
lower fertility rates and fewer
women of childbearing age.

Hispanic Population Gains
Stimulate Population
Growth of Minority Youth

Source: NCHS 1990 to 2012

From a demographic standpoint, Hispanics are driving
rapid increases in racial diversity
among America’s children. In fact,
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FIGURE 5. FERTILITY RATE FOR WOMEN AGE 20–29 AND 30–39 BY RACE/
HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2007 AND 2012

Source: NCHS 2007 and 2012

75 percent of the growth in the
minority child population between
2000 and 2012 was attributable to
Hispanic births. The initial reason for recent population gains in
Hispanic children has been immigration. Between 2000 and 2012,
5.6 million Hispanics immigrated
to the United States, supplementing
the 7.7 million who arrived during
the 1990s. Most new immigrants
are young adults of prime childbearing age. This influx, coupled
with the large Hispanic population
of childbearing age already in the
United States, produced the surge
in Hispanic births.
Indeed, three-fourths of the
entire Hispanic population gain
between July of 2011 and July of
2012 came from natural increase—
the difference between births and
deaths—rather than immigration.
Furthermore, this percentage is

increasing. Hispanics are also
younger, which influences mortality as well as fertility. In 2012,
there were 6.7 births for every
Hispanic death; in contrast, the
ratio was 1.0 and 2.4 births for
every death among non-Hispanic
whites and blacks, respectively.

Three-fourths of the entire
Hispanic population gain
between July of 2011 and July
of 2012 came from natural
increase—the difference
between births and deaths—
rather than immigration.
This high birth-to-death ratio is
responsible for increasing numbers and shares of Hispanics.
Indeed, Hispanics accounted for
54.5 percent of the U.S. population
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gain between 2000 and 2012,
although they represented only
16.9 percent of the population.
An increasing share of minority
children are U.S. born rather than
foreign born. Minority children—
particularly Hispanics and
Asians—are the new second
generation (that is, native-born of
foreign-born parents). U.S.‒born
children accounted for at least
95 percent of all children under
the age of 5 for each of the major
minority groups considered here in
2012. A substantial share of nativeborn minorities was born to foreign-born parents, some of whom
are undocumented immigrants,
raising new policy concerns about
so-called anchor babies—children
who are U.S. citizens but whose
parents are undocumented—
although the empirical evidence is
limited. In 2008, only 39 percent of
0- to 4-year-old Hispanic children
had two native-born parents. At
that time, an additional 17 percent
had one native-born parent and the
remaining 44 percent had two foreign-born parents. In 2008, the Pew
Research Center estimated that 40
percent of native-born Hispanics
under age 18 with at least one
foreign-born parent had at least
one unauthorized parent. However,
the oldest U.S.‒born children of
the Hispanic immigrant streams
arriving in large numbers in the
1980s and 1990s are now having
children of their own. As a result,
the percentage of Hispanic children
with U.S.‒born parents is expected
to grow in the near future. In fact,
the Pew Research Center estimates
that the share of Hispanic youth
who are the children of immigrants
will soon peak.3
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Minority Youth
Populations Increasing
Fastest Outside Large
Urban Cores
The conventional wisdom is that
increasing diversity is primarily a
big-city phenomenon. However, the
evidence suggests otherwise; the
new growth of minority children
is spatially broad-based. In fact,
the largest absolute and percentage gains are outside the urban
core counties of metropolitan areas
with more than 1 million residents
(Figure 6). Indeed, the suburban
and smaller metropolitan counties, in which minority population
gains are now most heavily concentrated, are home to 45.1 million
(55 percent) of the nation’s 82.5
million young people. A significant
majority are non-Hispanic white
(59 percent), despite a decline of

2.6 million (-9.1 percent) since
2000. In contrast, minority children
and youth populations, regardless
of racial and ethnic background,
grew rapidly outside the largest
metropolitan cores. The number of
Hispanic youth, for example, has
swelled by 3.4 million (58.7 percent)
since 2000; this is the largest gain of
any minority population in any area
during this period.
In large urban cores, where
minority populations have traditionally clustered, 66 percent of the
24.5 million children and youth are
minorities. The population of minority children has grown by more than
1.8 million in these areas since 2000.
Population declines among blacks
and whites have been offset by this
large Hispanic population gain.
Minority children constitute a considerably smaller share of all nonmetropolitan children (29 percent) than

FIGURE 6. POPULATION CHANGE FOR THOSE UNDER AGE 20 BY RACE/HISPANIC
ORIGIN AND METROPOLITAN STATUS, FROM 2000 TO 2012

Source: U.S. Decennial Census 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

of metropolitan children (51 percent).
In fact, rural areas had 837,000 fewer
young people in 2012 than in 2000,
because there were 1.4 million (-12.9
percent) fewer non-Hispanic white
youths. Declines in the young black
population were nearly proportionally
equal to decline in the young white
population (-12.4 percent). The large
population gains in Hispanic young
people (48.2 percent) were insufficient
to fully offset losses of blacks and
non-Hispanic whites. As a result, the
rural youth population declined by
6.1 percent after 2000.
National trends mask substantial
geographic variation in America’s
racial and ethnic makeup. The
majority of the young population
in 606 counties is now composed of
minorities (that is, majority-minority
counties), and another 306 counties
are near majority-minority status,
with between 40 and 50 percent
minority youth populations (Figure
7). Young people clearly are a harbinger of future racial change and
diversity in America, particularly as
deaths among the older, primarily
white population are disproportionately replaced by minority births. In
2012, substantially more counties
had majority-minority youth populations than counties that had majority-minority populations spanning
all age groups (606 versus 353).
Most majority-minority counties are concentrated in traditional
minority settlement areas. For
example, large minority youth
population clusters, particularly in
the Southwest and the Mississippi
Delta, are a continuing legacy of
America’s past (for example, slavery
in the South). New concentrations
of majority-minority counties in
the Carolinas and Georgia, in the
Pacific Northwest, and in Colorado
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FIGURE 7. CONCENTRATION OF MINORITY POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012

Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

also reflect the geographic spread
of minority children and youth,
particularly Hispanics.
Even in regions in which minorities are not approaching majority
status, diversity is rapidly accelerating. To illustrate this trend, we
calculated a diversity index, which
indicates the probability that two
randomly selected young people
in a county will be of a different
race or ethnicity. For example, a
diversity index of 0.50 means that

a young person residing in that
county has approximately a 50 percent chance of random exposure to
a young county resident who is of a
different race or ethnicity.
Nearly all of the Southeast and
Southwest have at least moderate levels of diversity, and that
diversity extends to the sprawling metropolitan regions of the
Midwest and East (Figure 8).
However, large areas of the country reveal comparatively limited

racial and ethnic diversity, including the vast agriculture heartland
in the upper Midwest with the
exception of scattered counties
in the Great Plains (for example,
Native American Reservations and
new Hispanic destinations with
food processing plants). Diversity
is also modest in the Northeast
in areas outside the coastal urban
agglomeration.
The combination of specific
minority groups creating or
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FIGURE 8. RACIAL DIVERSITY OF POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012

Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

limiting diversity varies by place
(Figure 9). Here, a spatial representation of minority youth concentrations reflects the number of
minority groups that represented
more than 10 percent of the youth
population in a given county. The
map reflects both the vestiges of
historical minority settlement patterns and the influence of contemporary demographic trends.
The large county clusters with
significant black youth minorities

in the South reflect historical black settlement patterns in
the antebellum South. The new
spatial distribution of Hispanics
in the Southwest reflects historical patterns of border settlement,
contemporary migration, and
natural population increase. The
scattered clusters of native peoples
also illustrate a legacy of traditional settlement patterns and
forced resettlement. However, for
nearly one-half of all counties,

no minority groups reached 10
percent of the population, underscoring a simple but straightforward demographic point: National
data are often used to suggest the
rapid spread of diversity, glossing
over large disparities in the spatial
distribution of minority youth.
In 2012, only 322 counties
had two youth minority groups
that each represented 10 percent
of the overall county population. Nevertheless, the effect of
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FIGURE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITY POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012

Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)

contemporary trends was most
evident in these counties. In North
Carolina, where blacks were once
the only visible minority population, diversity is now redefined by
the recent arrival of Hispanics.4
The scattered Hispanic population
clusters in traditional agricultural
areas of the Great Plains and Corn
Belt also reflect contemporary
demographic trends. Here the
demand for agricultural-related
labor, such as meatpacking and

irrigated agriculture, exceeded
the local labor force depleted by
decades of white out-migration
and low fertility. The influx of
young Hispanic families has
important demographic consequences as well. Minority inmigration may break the cycle
of natural population decrease
caused by persistent out-migration
and low fertility of natives.
In the Washington, DC metropolitan area, the historical

concentration of blacks, combined with recent in-migration
of Hispanics and Asians, have
produced one of America’s most
diverse populations of children
and youth. Such broadly diverse
counties remain rare, however,
even when our demographic lens
focuses on young people. Only 24
of the 3,141 U.S. counties contained three or more identifiable
minority youth populations (of 10
percent or more) in 2012.
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Conclusion
Issues of race and racial inclusion
continue to occupy much of public
discourse in America. The influx of
nearly 1 million immigrants annually—primarily from Latin America
and Asia—has further fueled debates
about multiculturalism and social,
economic, and cultural fragmentation (for example, English language
use, increasing multiracial intermarriage, increasing multiracial populations, and political and economic
power). The Census Bureau’s recent
projection of a majority-minority U.S.
population by the middle of the century has sometimes been the source
of alarmist rhetoric about the role
of immigration in America’s future
and the nation’s essential character.
We argue here that racial and ethnic
multiculturalism are also driven by
recent fertility patterns in the United
States, revealed in the rapidly increasing racial and ethnic diversity among
America’s children and youth.
Our research highlights the two
demographic forces that have placed
today’s young people in the forefront of America’s new racial and
ethnic diversity. The first is the rapid
increase in the number of minority
youths, with Hispanics accounting
for the vast majority of population
gains since 2000. A second but less
widely recognized shift is the absolute decline of non-Hispanic white
young people. Together, these two
trends have resulted in increasing
proportions of minority children
and youth. America is becoming a
majority-minority society—with
children leading the way.
The Great Recession and its
aftermath have slowed the growth of
the U.S. population. Had the recession not occurred and the fertility

trends of 2007 been sustained, we
estimate there would have been 1.3
million additional births between
2007 and 2012. Furthermore, if past
fertility trends persisted, more than
one-half of all these foregone births
would likely have been minority.
Key questions are as follows: Are
these foregone births lost forever or
simply delayed, to be made up as
the economy recovers? If they are
delayed births, how quickly will they
come and will the rate of increase
be consistent for all racial/Hispanic
groups? As is evident from our
previous analysis, disproportionate
shares of the foregone births were
to Hispanic mothers. If Hispanic
women now have children who were
delayed during the recession, youth
diversity will accelerate quicker.
An additional question concerns
the timing of the births that did
not occur because of the recession.

If the “catch-up” in births occurs
simultaneously with higher fertility
rates typical of economic recovery
and growth, the result will be a
significant surge in births and larger
cohorts of young children. However,
although the pace and pattern of
fertility change resulting from the
recession has short-term implications, powerful demographic forces
guarantee that America’s children
and youth will lead the nation’s
increasing diversity.
Our results also highlight the
increasing racial divide along the
dimensions of age and geography. Approximately 47 percent
of the youth population in 2012
were minority, compared with 36
percent of the 40- to 45-year-olds
and less than 21 percent of those
65 and older (Figure 10), raising
important questions about intergenerational support for social

FIGURE 10. PERCENT OF YOUNG, WORKING AGE, AND SENIOR POPULATION THAT
IS NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND MINORITY, 2012, 2030, AND 2050 PROJECTIONS

Source: U.S. Census Estimates and Projections
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programs.5 For example, will
America’s older, primarily white
population—through the ballot
box and collective self-interest—
support young people who are
now much different racially and
perhaps culturally from themselves and their own children?
Will the older, white population
vote to raise taxes to assist schools
that serve young people who differ
from them ethnically or racially?
Some evidence suggests that the
presence of large fractions of
elderly residents in a jurisdiction
is associated with significantly
less spending per-child for education, particularly if the elderly
and children are disproportionately represented across racial
and ethnic groups.6 On the other
hand, it is likely that increasing
shares of America’s seniors will
have children and grandchildren
who are in or result from interracial marriages, a fact that binds
generations rather than separates
them. Conversely, as the minority
population ages and constitutes a
larger proportion of the workingand voting-age population, will
they be supportive of expanding
entitlement programs for older
adults who will still be primarily
non-Hispanic white?
Our finding of greater diversity among the nation’s youngest
residents also offers grounds for
optimism. The multiracial and
multiethnic character of communities in which children are
raised influence race relations and
cultural boundaries, both now and
in the future. Diverse communities provide better opportunities
for mutual understanding and
acceptance. For America’s young

people, increasing exposure to
racial diversity will remake patterns of multiracial relations and
friendship networks. Attitude surveys show that young people are
much more racially tolerant than
older people and that prejudice
has declined as the older generation fades from the scene to be
replaced by the next generation.7

America is becoming a majorityminority society—with children
leading the way.
Optimism about improved relations among young people of diverse
backgrounds must be tempered by
spatial disparities in racial composition and diversity. The increasing racial and ethnic diversity of
America’s youth is no longer limited
to the large multiracial urban cores or
to regions where minorities historically settled. Instead, the post-2000
period ushered in a new pattern of
accelerated dispersion among minority children and youth. Yet, broad
geographic regions still provide few
significant opportunities for daily
interaction between young people
with different racial and cultural
backgrounds. Furthermore, evidence
of increasing racial diversity among
youth at the county level does not
demonstrate that diversity exists
across communities or neighborhoods.8 The geographic landscape
of race currently suggests two
Americas—an increasingly racially
diverse nation versus a primarily
white nation. Opportunities for racial
and ethnic interaction, and opportunities for mutual understanding and
acceptance, vary by place.
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Our research contributes to
policy discussions by highlighting the new diversity among
America’s youth and the changing
geographic scale of the expression
of this diversity. Our research also
provides a window to America’s
future.9 As we demonstrate here,
the changing racial and ethnic
composition of America’s youngest
populations can be traced to two
forces: differential changes in the
numbers of women of childbearing
age by race and Hispanic origin,
and differential rates of fertility,
particularly higher fertility among
Hispanics, which is a by-product
of recent immigration trends. In a
policy environment usually focused
on immigration, recognizing the
rising importance of other demographic factors is no small achievement. With or without restrictive
immigration legislation, America is
becoming an increasingly diverse
society though this diversity is
experienced unevenly spatially.
Natural population increase—
particularly fertility rates—will
continue to reshape the racial and
ethnic mix of the country, and this
change will be reflected first among
the nation’s youngest residents.

Methodology
We used multiple sources of data for
our analyses. The primary sources of
contemporary data are the Decennial
Census of 2010 and Census Bureau
annual estimates of the population by age, sex, race, and Hispanic
origin from April of 2010 to July of
2012, released in May of 2013.10 We
also used Census Bureau estimates
of births and deaths by race and
Hispanic origin. We supplemented
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these sources with historical data
from the 1990 and 2000 Census that
has been adjusted for under enumeration by age, race, and Hispanic
origin. Furthermore, respondents
who classified themselves as multiracial in 2000 were allocated to racial
categories to make them compatible
with the 1990 census data.11 We also
used birth data from the National
Center for Health Statistics to examine fertility rates and trends.12
Understanding America’s changing racial and ethnic composition is a
challenging endeavor, partly because
measurement is typically based on
self-identification or self-reporting.
Racial and ethnic self-identification is
also highly subjective, situational, and
fluid. We cannot adjudicate current
debates about proper racial and ethnic
classification using the secondary data
at our disposal. We therefore advise a
cautious approach to the evidence and
recognition of the inherent subjective
nature of our demographic exercise.
For most purposes, we classified the population into four
groups: (1) Hispanics of any race,
(2) non-Hispanic whites, (3) nonHispanic blacks, and (4) all other
non-Hispanics, including those
who reported two or more races.
Asians were the largest racial group
included in this fourth category,
constituting 51 percent of those
under age 19 in the category. Also
included in this category are native
peoples and those of two or more
races. We also grouped the population into two age groups: Persons
age 19 or younger were classified as
“young,” or the youth population.
Individuals older than age 19 were
grouped together into an “adult”
category, which we occasionally
refer to as the older population.

To examine the uneven spatial
distribution of different racial and
ethnic populations, we calculated
summary measures of diversity.
First, we estimated the number and
percentage of majority-minority
counties—those with at least onehalf the young population composed of minority groups—and
near majority-minority counties—
those with minorities constituting
between 40 and 50 percent of the
population. Counties were also
classified as having minority youth
concentrations if more than 10
percent of the young population
was from a specific minority group.
Four minority groups that reached
the 10 percent threshold in at least
one county were as follows: blacks,
Hispanics, Asians, and Native
Americans. Counties that had two
or more minority groups each
reaching the 10 percent threshold
were classified as multiethnic.
We also calculated a diversity
index (DI), the so-called Simpson
Index, which measures the racial
and ethnic diversity of the population.13 It was calculated as follows:
DI = 1 - (H2 + W2 + B2 + A2 + N2
+ M 2)
where H is the Hispanic proportion, W is the non-Hispanic white
proportion, B is the non-Hispanic
black proportion, A is the nonHispanic Asian proportion, N is
the non-Hispanic native peoples
proportion, and M is the non-Hispanic multiracial proportion (that
is, those constituting two or more
races). The values of DI range from
0, which indicates that a county is
made up entirely of one race/ethnicity, to a maximum value of 0.83,
which means that each race/ethnicity constitutes exactly one-sixth of

the population. DI has a straightforward and intuitive interpretation.
It measures the probability that any
two children, picked at random in a
county, would be of a different race
or ethnicity (for example, Hispanic
or non-Hispanic).
Our analysis included all 3,143
U.S. counties. We used county
equivalents in the New England
states, and we classified counties as
metro or nonmetro using the 2003
definition created by the Office of
Management and Budget. Metro
areas included counties containing an urban core (or central city)
population of 50,000 or more
along with adjacent counties that
are highly integrated with the core
county, as measured by commuting patterns. There are 1,090 metro
counties in the United States. We
classified the remaining 2,053
counties as nonmetro. For ease
of exposition, we used the terms
metro and urban (and nonmetro
and rural) interchangeably. We
identified large metro core counties
as those counties containing the
central city of metropolitan areas of
1 million people or more, and we
considered them separately from
all other metropolitan counties.
This was an important distinction,
because metro counties with large
urban cores historically have had
large concentrations of minorities.
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